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The paper provides fresh empirical evidence on the relative con-
tribution of ﬁnal and intermediate demand to changes in the sectoral
structure of advanced economies. These latter have led, over the last
three decades, to the massive growth of service sectors, most especially
the business services. The paper draws upon the recently released
OECD Input–Output (I–O) tables. The empirical analysis is based
on an I–O Structural Decomposition Analysis (SDA) carried out on
13 manufacturing and service sectors, from the end of 1960s to the end
of 1990s. Although heterogeneous sectoral patterns emerge, we ﬁnd
that the largest contribution to the the structural changes leading to
the growth of services stems from (domestic) ﬁnal demand, whereas
the role of foreign trade remains marginal even in the last decade.
Changes in the sectoral intermediate linkages have instead been the
main responsible for the growth of KIBS (Knowledge Intensive Busi-
ness Services), along with a sustained contribution of ﬁnal consump-
tion. We suggest that the role of (domestic) demand constraints might
aﬀect the degree of exploitation of technological opportunities and the
patterns of growth, even in the case of the most technologically ad-
vanced service sectors, and we indicate future steps of research.
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1 Introduction
A recent collection of contributions on the economics of services (ten Raa
and Schettkat, 2001) has addressed the question of why advanced economies
are still experiencing sustained growth rates of real output and employment
of service industries despite trends of increasing input costs and prices (see
also Appelbaum and Schettkat, 1999; Pugno, 2006). According to ten Raa
and Schettkat (2001), the solutions to the ‘service paradox’ are consistent
with the identiﬁcation of few methodological and empirical issues.
On the one hand, the mere problems of measurement of output of service
activities are still at stake and behind the mystiﬁcation of the real contribu-
tion of services to the aggregate growth. Among these, we might mention the
deﬁnition of the production unit, the use of an appropriate price deﬂator to
obtain real ﬁgures, the inclusion of quality eﬀects to adjust price deﬂators,
the diﬃculties of including total production factors — rather than labour
only — to obtain productivity indicators for services. Yet, the potential
mis–measurement of real output and productivity of services had already
been raised in a comprehensive work by Griliches (1992) almost two decades
ago, leaving the ‘service paradox’ unresolved since.
On the other hand, since the debate around tertiarisation started (Clark,
1940), the growth of services’ real output shares has been mainly attributed
to shifts in private domestic consumption, which is in turn claimed to be
mainly sustained by a positive income eﬀect, more than compensating a neg-
ative price eﬀect. However, the demand for services has been overall steadily
growing, whereas average real income growth rates have been slightly declin-
ing over time from mid–1970s onwards (ten Raa and Schettkat, 2001). Hence,
it is likely that behind the whole paradox a ‘change in demand conditions’
dominates over the pure (ﬁnal) income and price eﬀects, as the authors claim
in the conclusions.
However, the black box of the ‘change in demand conditions’ has been
vaguely put forward but not properly unfolded. Further, we argue here,
the ‘service paradox’ is likely to have been aﬀected by major (ICT–driven)
technological changes in services over the last two decades. These latter are
crucial, as most likely they have a two–fold impact on service performance: a
direct one on the productivity ﬁgures and an indirect one on output growth,
via the changing composition of ﬁnal and intermediate demand for services.
2This work starts from the empirical stylised fact of the ‘service paradox’,
as put forward by ten Raa and Schettkat (2001). Our conjecture can be
summarised as follows. The ‘service paradox’, and particularly the black box
of the ‘change in demand conditions’ is likely to be related to changes in the
composition of intermediate demand for services. These latter follow changes
in the inter–industry division of labour between services and the rest of the
economy. Changes in intermediate links are argued here to complement —
and in some case dominate — the role of income– and price–led change of
ﬁnal demand in accounting for the structural change leading to the growth
of services.
We aim to shed light on this issue by providing fresh empirical evidence
on the relative role of (changes in) ﬁnal and intermediate demand as aﬀecting
the changes in the sectoral structure of advanced economies. The paper draws
upon the recently released OECD Input–Output (I–O) tables. The empirical
analysis is based on an I–O Structural Decomposition Analysis 1 carried out
on 13 manufacturing and service sectors, from the end of 1960s to the end of
1990s. With respect to the existing literature, our empirical contribution is
twofold:
First, we put particular emphasis on the sectoral diﬀerences, particularly
across selected branches of manufacturing and services, in terms of the rela-
tive contribution of ﬁnal and intermediate demand to the (sectoral) output
growth;
Secondly, we extend the analysis to the most recent dynamics of such
contribution, covering the time–span from the end of the 1960s to the end of
the 1990s. This allows us to shed light on whether the massive adoption of
ICTs, mainly by service industries, in the most recent decades has brought
about a signiﬁcant change of inter–industry linkages involving a major in-
crease of service intermediate inputs for the rest of the economy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Next section brieﬂy
addresses the theoretical and empirical literature relevant to the case in
analysis. In particular, we revert to the ‘old’ and ‘new’ debate on the de-
terminants of the tertiarisation process, being it the most relevant case of
structural change of sectoral composition of advanced economies since the
First Industrial Revolution. Section 3 describes the methodology of I–O
SDA and the data source. Section 4 provides the results of the I–O SDA
of the (intermediate vs ﬁnal) contribution to structural change, carried out
on 13 manufacturing and service sector in four OECD countries (Germany,
1(For a review and reassessment of the tool see Rose and Casler, 1996; Pugno, 2006).
3The Netherlands, UK and USA). The ﬁnal section summarises the ﬁndings,
draws the conclusions and highlights future directions of research.
2 The debate around tertiarisation
The age–old debate on the determinants of economic growth has been charac-
terised by radical shifts of concern over time. The preoccupation of classical
economists with the problems of accumulation and division of labour as af-
fecting countries’ economic growth was at the core of the economic debate
until the marginalist revolution in the end of the nineteenth century. The
focus of the analysis then shifted toward the problem of the optimal alloca-
tion of scarce resources and became dominant for growth economists. Two
main contributions emerge as outstanding responses to the neoclassical or-
thodoxy. These are the works of Schumpeter (1934) and Keynes (1936). The
former called attention to the role of innovation for economic growth and
development. The latter radically criticised the causal direction imposed by
Say’s Law — i.e. that supply always creates its own demand — and argued
that the dynamics of demand might act as a constraint on the dynamics of
macroeconomic growth, when resources are not fully employed.
Despite both being immune to the dominance of the marginalist ortho-
doxy, the streams of literature developed since have suﬀered and still suﬀer
from a general fracture. In particular, the lack of any systematic attempt
to provide a unifying framework between the neo–Schumpeterian and post–
Keynesian theoretical approaches in tackling the issue of the eﬀects of struc-
tural change on macro–economic growth is argued here to be particularly
severe.
The ‘creative destruction’ brought about by scientiﬁc discovery and the
consequences of its economic applications have been at the core of Schum-
peter’s contribution (Schumpeter, 1934). The importance of technical change
for growth and competitiveness of ﬁrms, sectors and countries has been em-
phasised and reprised within the neo–Schumpeterian stream of literature,
starting from the seminal contribution by Nelson and Winter (1982) 2 This
stream of literature is however characterised by an almost exclusive focus on
the nature and economic eﬀects of technology adoption and diﬀusion at the
micro–level of analysis, neglecting both the role of the demand–side deter-
minants of ﬁrms’ strategic behaviours and the consequences of macro–level
demand constraints. On the other hand, the post–Keynesian stream of lit-
erature has tended by and large to overlook the role of technical change, es-
pecially at the micro–level of analysis Kaldor (1957), Kaldor (1975) ,Kaldor
2(See also, among others, Dosi and Soete., 1988).
4(1978) and, for a recent reassessment, see Llerena and Lorentz (2004a)).
Yet, both technical change and demand might disrupt the steady path of
macroeconomic growth, as well as the structural composition of the economy
(Pasinetti, 1981).
Within the neo–Schumpeterian stream of literature, there are very few
attempts to encompass both technology and demand as aﬀecting economic
growth, based on the use of diﬀerent methodological tools (Fagerberg, 1994;
Fagerberg, 2000; Montobbio, 2002; Verspagen, 2002a; Verspagen, 2002b; Ller-
ena and Lorentz, 2004b). Yet, the ‘side eﬀects’ of both technical change and
demand–constraints on the structural change of economies are not contem-
plated in depth by these studies, particularly at the meso–level of analysis.
Nor, as a consequence, do they account for technology and demand as af-
fecting the transmission of meso–level structural changes into aggregate out-
comes. Further, the conceptualisation and empirical investigation of the na-
ture of technical change and its impact on economic growth has been mainly
conﬁned to the manufacturing industries, leaving the case of the growth of
services relatively under–explored. This is somehow puzzling as the processes
of tertiarisation occurring in the advanced economies over the past decades
represent, as a matter of fact, the most relevant case of structural change
of the employment composition of the economy since the First Industrial
Revolution.
Despite the renewed and increasing awareness of the importance of this
domain of analysis (Baumol, 2001; ten Raa and Schettkat, 2001; Peneder,
Kaniovsky, and Dachs, 2003; Schettkat and Yocarini, 2006), the literature
on the economics of services is still characterised by very diverse and frag-
mented investigations with an absence of explicit theoretical aﬃliation. In
our view, the above mentioned fracture between the neo–Schumpeterian and
post–Keynesian approaches is particularly evident in the domain of the eco-
nomics of services. This literature has so far lacked provision for a unifying
framework able to account for the eﬀects of both technical change and the
changing patterns of ﬁnal and intermediate demand on the massive tertiari-
sation of advanced economies over the last few decades. Phrased it otherwise,
the black box of the ‘changing demand conditions’ has still to be unfolded,
and this is even more so in the case of services.
A peculiar feature of the literature on services is in fact something of a
theoretical and methodological discontinuity in the main areas of investiga-
tion and, particularly, related to concerns about the eﬀects of the growth
of services. What we might now label as the ‘old’ debate on the growth
of services mostly revolved around its contribution to the overall produc-
tivity and growth performance of national economies. This latter aspect,
though, has become rather controversial among economists over time. Since
5the end of the 1960s, Baumol’s ‘cost–disease’ (Baumol, 1967; Baumol and
Bowen, 1966; Baumol, Blackman, and Wolﬀ, 1985; Baumol, Blackman, and
Wolﬀ, 1989) as aﬀecting the productivity performance of services has been
the largely dominant view within the academic debate over the impact of the
growth of services. Further, evidence on the various waves of ‘productivity
slowdown’ has often been imputed to structural change in the employment
composition of economies toward service activities (Kaldor, 1966). The con-
cern about de–industrialisation of the advanced economies lies at the core of
the economic debate up to the 1980s.
However, no formally rigorous or empirically grounded attempt, perhaps
with the exception of the work of Fuchs (1968), has been made to identify
the determinants of the processes of tertiarisation. None of the contributors
to the ‘old debate’ to the economics of services has accounted for both supply
and demand–side determinants of the growth of services at the macro–level
of analysis.
Only recently, buoyed by a wave of enthusiasm about the growth potential
linked to the suggestive labels of the ‘New Economy’ and the ‘ICT revolution’
(OECD, 2000; Van Ark and McGuckin, 2002), has this attitude changed. A
renewed and increasing interest in the economic performance of services as
being positively aﬀected by the new Information and Communication Tech-
nology (ICT) paradigm has diﬀused among economists and scholars of tech-
nical change. The preoccupation with the de–industrialisation of economies
and the productivity slowdown, which dominated the ‘old’ debate, seems to
have turned into a new, hyper–optimistic view of the new growth potential
linked to services. Concern about the loss of industrial leadership in terms
of manufacturing shares of total national production seems to have been dis-
placed by the view that services are the main engine for the creation of ‘new’
jobs, a view which is extending also to developing countries (Dasgupta and
Singh, 2005). Furthermore, the argument of productivity slowdown being
linked to the poor productivity performance of services also seems to have
become outdated, as striking productivity performance in the ‘Knowledge
Intensive Business Services’ (KIBS 3is now viewed as oﬀsetting poorer perfor-
mance in the traditional branches. This is claimed as positively contributing
to the increase of average national productivity levels and growth.
We argue here that a common feature of both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’
debate revolving around the growth and economic performance of services
is the longstanding neglect of the role of demand and more speciﬁcally of
3The term Knowledge Intensive Business Services (KIBS) was ﬁrst coined by Miles
(1994), Miles, Kastrinos, Bilderbeek, and den Hertog (1995) and variously reprised (among
others, Gallouj, 2002).
6changes in intermediate links between service sectors and the rest of the
economy. Further, we believe that such neglect is a speciﬁc consequence
of more a general fracture between neo–Schumpeterian and post–Keynesian
theoretical approaches in tackling the issue of structural change and macro–
economic growth. This paper aims to provide a fresh empirical account of
the relative role of changes in ﬁnal and intermediate demand in determining
sectoral output growth, so to give empirical dimensions to the supply and
demand determinants of tertiarisation processes, covering the period from
the end of 1960s to the end of the 1990s. The empirical analysis draws upon
the use of I–O SDA, a fairly neutral tool from the theoretical point of view,
which will be illustrated at length in the next section.
3 Methodology and data source
Much eﬀort has been devoted to the identiﬁcation of the sources of structural
change in the empirical literature, particularly amongst the contributions in
the I–O tradition, starting with Leontief (1951) and Leontief (1953) seminal
work. Within the I–O framework, and more generally in the economic liter-
ature (Pasinetti, 1973), the use of I–O is grounded in the diﬀerence between
the industry and the vertically integrated sector (see also for a reassessment
Milana, 2001) and (Kox, 2001). This latter is an
‘Accounting entity, to which are attributed the cost of primary
inputs used directly [...] and indirectly to produce all the inter-
mediate inputs that are supplied to the industry examined by
other industries.’
(Milana, 2001, p. 3). A full empirical account of structural economic change
relies on the assessment of changes in sectoral interdependencies. In turn,
such assessment adopts the notion of vertically integrated sectors and as-
sumes the Leontief hypothesis of zero elasticity of price–induced input sub-
stitution.
A widely used technique to identify the relative contribution of diﬀer-
ent determinants of the (aggregate and sectoral — e.g. structural economic
change) output growth is I–O Structural Decomposition Analysis (SDA). I–O
SDA decomposes macro and industry output growth into the relative contri-
bution of changes in technology coeﬃcients and changes in patterns of ﬁnal
domestic and foreign demand.
The SDA is based on an accounting identity, the basic material balance
equation, which decomposes the output growth Q between two points in time





















Q is the output at time t;
L is the Leontiev–inverse matrix of direct and indirect input coeﬃcients At
at time t;
FD is the ﬁnal demand at time t, respectively composed of private and pub-
lic consumption (C); investment and changes in stock (I); net exports (TR),
all at time t.
All the components must be read as average annual growth rates ex-
pressed in terms of the average change in percentage points of output relative
to the base year (i.e. weighted by z, the number of years considered). This al-
lows cross–country comparisons, as z, the time–span between two subsequent
I–O tables, is diﬀerent across countries.
Equation 1 thus represents the basic identity for the decomposition of
output growth into its constitutive components, namely:
(i) INTERMEDIATE DEMAND CHANGE or technological change, that
is output growth due to changes in the intermediate demand per unit
of output, or alternatively changes in the Leontief–inverse matrix of
technology coeﬃcients (holding constant total ﬁnal demand). In this
context, this component captures changes in the organisation of pro-
duction in the sectors, implying an increase in the intensity of demand
for some intermediate inputs. The impact of technological innovation is
therefore not directly captured here4. Rather, the SDA allows to isolate
its eﬀects on the sectoral production function. It is likely that most of
the changes in intermediate coeﬃcients for services are attributable to
the adoption of new technologies, which drives changes in the demand
for intermediate service functions and in sectoral interdependences.
(ii) FINAL DEMAND CHANGE (CONSUMPTION), that is output changes
directly imputable to changes in the levels of ﬁnal (private and public)
consumption (holding constant the matrix of intermediate coeﬃcients).
This component accounts therefore for the direct impact of increases in
4For a recent debate on the diﬀerence between the notion of technological change within
an Input–Output framework and in other approaches, see Dosi and Grazzi (2006).
8consumption, due to both general shifts in patterns of taste and prefer-
ence as well as income elasticities of ﬁnal demand and increasing levels
of public procurement of the diﬀerent sectors’ output.
(iii) FINAL DEMAND CHANGE (CAPITAL STOCK), that is output changes
due to shifts in the level of investment (holding constant the matrix of
intermediate coeﬃcients). This component explains the output growth
due to an increasing demand for material and capital goods. It is use-
ful to bear in mind that, within an Input Output framework, changes
in the level of capital stocks are included amongst the ﬁnal demand
components.
(iv) FINAL DEMAND CHANGE (NET EXPORTS), that is output growth
mainly pulled by shifts in foreign ﬁnal demand (net of imports), holding
constant the matrix of intermediate coeﬃcients. As far as services are
concerned, this component accounts for positive shifts in international
comparative advantage in favour of some of the service sectors, which
are becoming increasingly tradable on the international market.
Since its early applications, the use of SDA as a tool has been extended
and developed (for an exhaustive review see Rose and Casler, 1996). The
most recent applications of I–O SDA mostly use single–country I–O tables.
Driver (1994) use UK tables, Korres (1996) the Greek tables, and Andreosso-
O’Callaghan and Y. (2002) the Chinese I–O tables. Peneder, Kaniovsky, and
Dachs (2003) apply SDA to selected OECD countries. All these contribu-
tions, however, refer either to all the sectors provided by the I–O tables
or to the macro–branches of the economy — i.e. primary, secondary and
tertiary. However, as Driver (1994) points out, even the use of a simple in-
dex of structural change, mainly constructed in terms of variously weighted
deviation measures of changes in sectoral proportions of economic activity,
presents a major drawback in being heavily inﬂuenced by the level of aggre-
gation chosen. The choice of level of aggregation is not trivial, and this is also
the case when using SDA. The I–O data are available at a high level of dis-
aggregation, which allows diﬀerent levels of structural change to be captured
— i.e. from mechanicals to chemicals or from manufacturing to services.
Unlike in the existing literature, in this work we apply the SDA technique
to 13 selected macro–branches of the economy. The service branches have
been selected and re–aggregated on the basis of a criterion of homogeneity
in the product characteristics and the technological content, based on pre-
vious work (Cainelli, Evangelista, and Savona, 2006). This allows us both
to cover the whole economy and at the same time to preserve a reasonable
9and readable degree of sectoral dimension of the analysis, in order to identify
peculiarities of service vis–` a–vis manufacturing industries.5
We draw upon the OECD harmonised I–O tables. The database is de-
signed to capture changes in the structure of the OECD economies since
the late 1960s, before the 1973 oil shock, in the mid–1980s and up to the
1990s. I–O data for the 1990s have been recently released by OECD and
have been included in this work to update the I–O SDA carried out on the
previous ones and used in our previous work (Savona, 2004).The old I–O ta-
bles were available in current and constant national currencies in producers’
prices, but for diﬀerent base years. With the exception of Australia (1989),
Canada (1986), Germany (1985), Japan (1985) and the USA (1982), most
countries have 1980 as base year. Unfortunately, OECD did not provide the
new I–O tables in constant prices. To allow for country and time compa-
rability, therefore, in this work we have re–deﬂated all the (old and new)
current price tables, on the basis of the GDP market price index, this time
using a common base–year (1985). Further, it should be noted that OECD
provided the new tables in basic prices, whereas the old ones were expressed
in producer’s price ﬁgures. We therefore opted to use the GDP market price
deﬂator index, bearing in mind that a possible distortion in cross–country
comparability might emerge, as the sectoral deﬂator for the new I–O tables
was not available.We therefore carry out the empirical decomposition only
on the basis of constant ﬁgures (in national currencies, base year 1985). 6
5More in particular, we have included:
• the macro–branch of primary sector (AGRI);
• six manufacturing macro–branches, which aggregate respectively: food, beverage
and tobacco (FOOD); textile, leather and footwear (TEXTILE); wood, cork, pulp,
paper, printing and publishing (WOOD); chemical, rubber, plastic, fuel and other
non–metallic minerals (CHEM); metals, machinery and equipment (MACHIN-
ERY); manufacturing n.e.c. (MANEC)
• the branch of public utilities (electricity, gas and water) and construction (ELEC);
(iv) ﬁve service macro–branches: wholesale, retail trade and hotel and restaurants
(TRADE); transport, storage and communication (TRACOM); banks, insurance
and ﬁnancial services (FINANCE); real estate, renting of machinery, computer and
related, R&D, business services (KIBS) community, social and personal services
(SOCIAL)
Table 1 in the Appendix provides a summary of the sectoral aggregation adopted for the
I–O SDA carried out in this article.
6See for more details, the OECD Report “The OECD Input Output
Database” and “Country Notes for The Input–Output Tables, ISIC REV.3”at
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/stat–ana/index.htm.
10We chose in this work to conﬁne our analysis to only four of the OECD
countries, namely Germany, The Netherlands, UK and USA, which present
diﬀerent patterns of sectoral output growth as well as diﬀerent contributions
of demand Vs. technology components of output growth, so that the cross–
country comparison allows some interesting inferences.
4 Results
This section presents the results of the I–O SDA for each single country.
Table 1 lists the sectoral aggregation used in the empirical I–O SDA. Tables
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,8, 9, in the Appendix, report the results of the SDA respectively
for Germany (Tables 2 and 3), The Netherlands (Tables 4 and 5), UK (Tables
6 and 7)and USA (Tables 8 and 9) for diﬀerent points in time, according to
the data availability for the four countries, and for the whole period covered.
The ﬁrst column in the tables refers to the average annual growth of
sectoral real output in percentage points. According to Equation (1), the
remaining columns report the contribution to each sectoral output growth
respectively of intermdiate demand (i), ﬁnal consumption (ii), investments
and change in capital stock (iii) and foreign demand (iv). The last four
columns add up to the sectoral output growth reported in the ﬁrst one.
4.1 Waves of tertiarisation and the KIBS
In all the countries considered in the analysis, and since the beginning of
1970s, real output growth has been positive in all service branches. Further,
the rate of growth of real output in service branches in all the sub–periods
and the countries considered has been higher than that experienced by man-
ufacturing branches, even the most dynamic (and especially machinery and
chemicals).
However, while in Germany and The Netherlands — and in the great
majority of the remaining OECD countries (Savona, 2004) — manufactur-
ing sectors (except the textile industry) have never shown negative output
growth, only UK and in part also the USA have suﬀered, between the end
of 1970s and mid–1980s, ‘cycles’ of de–industrialisation, both of the hard
manufacturing industrial base (e.g. machinery, chemicals) and of the ‘soft’
industry, such as textiles. Hence, in most OECD countries, the (real) out-
put gains of service branches have not displaced the manufacturing base of
countries. This evidence challenges most of the debate concerning the risk of
de–industrialisation as a direct consequence of tertiarisation processes start-
ing in the 1970s, yet it does explain the fact that most of the concern about
11the shrink of the industrial base which had informed the Baumolian ‘old’
debate originated from UK and USA.
The most peculiar patterns emerge for KIBS, both in terms of ﬁgures and
of counter–trends with respect to the sub–period considered. This branch
shows in fact persistent and high growth ﬁgures across time and country.
This ﬁnding is in line with the copious number of contributions ﬂourished in
the last decade 7, which show that not only KIBS are the recipient of most
of the employment and output growth occurred in the advanced economies,
but also that this trend has not been incompatible with high performance
in terms of technological innovation and productivity growth. We expect
this evidence to be driven by both profound changes in the inter–sectoral
linkages, with important increases in the demand for KIBS as intermediate
inputs coming from the rest of the economy, and by high levels and sustained
growth rate of ﬁnal demand. In this respect, much more uncertain is the role
of foreign demand. KIBS, and service activities more in general, have become
internationally traded only since the last decade, and therefore have not been
able to beneﬁt from the propulsive role of foreign trade for growth. The I–O
SDA analysis allows us to shed light both on the conjecture of the existence
of a particularly favourable combination of positive intermediate and ﬁnal
(domestic) demand, and on whether the role of foreign trade has changed
over time and might act nowadays as an engine for growth of services, the
way it did and does for the most of the manufacturing branches.
4.2 The contribution of the intermediate and ﬁnal de-
mand components
Going to the relative contribution of intermediate and ﬁnal demand to the
sectoral output growth, the ﬁrst observation emerging from the ﬁgures is that
each country seems to show diﬀerent characteristics.
As far as the domestic components are concerned, it emerges that ﬁnal
(public and private) consumption is steadily responsible for the sectoral pat-
terns of output growth across the diﬀerent sub–periods and for most of the
branches considered.
The role of intermediate demand turns out to be more heterogeneous
across countries, time and sectors. In particular, it seems to be negative or
at best neutral for most manufacturing branches across all the countries and
over time. For service branches, however, changes in intermediate coeﬃcients
7Among others, the work of Miles, Kastrinos, Bilderbeek, and den Hertog (1995),
OECD (2000), Kox (2001), Cainelli, Evangelista, and Savona (2006), Van Ark and
McGuckin (2002).
12represent a signiﬁcant (but not the ﬁrst) cause of real output growth. In other
words, the structural change favouring service branches has to be imputed
— in general — to the contribution of ﬁnal consumption, but a signiﬁcant
(and for the KIBS case even a higher) contribution stems from intermediate
demand. Instead, positive growth of manufacturing branches has mostly
resulted from the ﬁnal demand contribution, both domestic and foreign.
The role of foreign ﬁnal demand (net exports) is in contrast quite homo-
geneous across countries for services compared to manufacturing branches.
In particular, it makes no signiﬁcant contribution to the output growth of
service branches, conﬁrming that the internationalisation of services is a still
on–going process, that has started being underway only in the 1990s. Next
section will deal with the most recent development of such pattern.
As argued above, the most interesting sectoral speciﬁcity relates to the
branch of KIBS, for several reasons. First of all, we would expect that a
particularly propulsive role — complementary to the role of ﬁnal consumption
— in the output growth of this branch has been increasingly played by the
‘supply side’, which in an I–O framework is regarded as being the changes
in technological coeﬃcients. In fact, what emerges from the ﬁgures in the
tables is that changes in intermediate coeﬃcients do play a signiﬁcant role,
not only as compared to the average ﬁgures for the technology components
found for the other sectors, but also with respect to the magnitude of the
ﬁnal consumptions of KIBS themselves.
The contribution of the changes in intermediate coeﬃcients to the average
annual output growth of KIBS starts to become positive across the countries
considered already after mid–1970s. This adds up to a highly positive contri-
bution of ﬁnal consumption. In the cases of Germany and UK, intermediate
demand is the major source of output growth and, as a consequence, of struc-
tural change with respect to the manufacturing branches. This is not the case
for the US economy. Changes in the intermediate coeﬃcients do not emerge
to be the main source of output growth, neither for manufacturing — for
which the sign is mostly negative across time — nor for services, for which
the role of intermediate demand is comparatively much smaller than that of
ﬁnal (domestic) consumption.
All in all, the sources of structural change favouring the growth of KIBS,
compared to both the whole service sector and the whole economy more
generally, come from the intertwined contribution of changes in intermediate
demand coeﬃcients and the sustained role of ﬁnal consumption. The role
of ﬁnal demand for investments and, overall, foreign ﬁnal demand play a
marginal role (when not negative) in sustaining the growth of KIBS up to
1990.
134.3 The 1990s and the role of international trade
The empirical ﬁndings related to the 1990s allow to go more in depth into
the actual impact of the pervasive diﬀusion of the ‘ICT paradigm’ across
all the branches of the economy, and particularly in the case of KIBS and
ﬁnancial services. We have seen that a signiﬁcant boost of the intermedi-
ate demand component in aﬀecting the producer services (KIBS in primis)
has contributed to the output growth of these branches, as a consequence of
the increased inter–sectoral division of labour and intermediate demand for
ICT–related producer services. Further, we would expect more a signiﬁcant
role of the foreign demand component in aﬀecting services’ growth over the
last decade, as a plausible outcome of the much–advocated policies of trade
liberalisation of services and the remotion of trade barriers. As far as this last
empirical stylised fact is concerned, policy actions aiming to increase trade
liberalisation in services do not seem (yet) to have displayed any perceivable
eﬀect. The magnitude of the role of foreign demand remains marginal in
aﬀecting service sectors’ growth also in this last decade, and this evidence
holds across the four countries considered. Further, the role of the intermedi-
ate component of demand emerges to be not particularly stronger than in the
previous decades. Changes in the intermediate coeﬃcients tend to replicate
the same patterns of the previous sub–periods, turning out to be, even in the
1990s, a large responsible for the output growth of KIBS across European
countries, but not for the USA.
The evidence emerged on the role of foreign demand in determining the
sectoral output growth of services might be due to two possible explana-
tions. Either the much advocated policies of trade liberalisation extended
to services need a much longer time–span to display their eﬀects, or, rather,
they do not have (and possibly they will not have) any eﬃcacy even in the
long run. This second case might have crucial implications, both theoretical
and in terms of policy implications. Namely, it raises the crucial issues of
rethinking the models of international trade and economic growth when ap-
plied to services and, as a consequence, of assessing the actual eﬀectiveness
of trade liberalisation policies as growth–enhancing tools in the case of ser-
vice industries. This latter issue seems to be a promising avenue of future
research, particularly as the debate on globalisation of economic activities
and its economic and development impact seems to be still virulent amongst
economists as well as scholars of technical change.
145 Summary of the ﬁndings and conclusions
The paper adds to the still on–going debate on the determinants of tertiari-
sation, scketched in Section 2, by providing fresh empirical evidence on the
relative contribution of ﬁnal and intermediate demand to the output growth
of selected manufacturing and service branches over the past three decades.
The empirical literature dealing with the sources of structural change
within an Input–Output framework,recalled in Section 3, has tried to decom-
pose the relative role of technology and demand on sectoral output growth,
though conﬁning the analysis to the macro–branches of primary, manufac-
turing and service sectors. The contribution of this paper is in line with this
literature, but considers a more detailed sectoral breakdown, so to provide a
more articulated picture of the structural change of output growth, involving
13 diﬀerent service and manufacturing branches.
The ﬁndings can be summarised as follows:
1. Real output growth since the beginning of the ’70s has been positive
for most of the service branches considered, and particularly for the
KIBS; this holds for all the countries considered. Further, this seems
not to have crowded out the manufacturing branches, except in the UK
and USA, between the end of the ’70s and the beginning of the ’80s.
This is in fact the only sub–period for which there seems to emerge a
phase of de–industrialisation, though conﬁned to the cases of these two
countries.
2. The role of changes in intermediate coeﬃcients in real output growth is
much higher for service branches than for manufacturing. The sources
of structural change leading to services growth emerge as being linked
to both intermediate and ﬁnal demand, whereas the output growth
of manufacturing branches is mainly due to ﬁnal (private and public)
consumption. Unlike in manufacturing, foreign demand seems to have
played a marginal role in the output growth of services, and this trend
is conﬁrmed in the 1990s, for which empirical evidence has recently
been made available by OECD.
3. As far as the branch of KIBS is concerned, it emerges that the strong
dynamics of real output growth have been sustained not only by ﬁnal
demand, but also particularly by the dramatic changes in the coef-
ﬁcients of intermediate demand. This conﬁrms that KIBS represent
the most important case of structural change driven by intermediate
demand.
15It is worth to bear in mind that the results presented here might be
aﬀected by the following factors, which we have not been able to take in due
account:
1. The use of a GDP rather than a sectoral deﬂator might distort the
inter–sectoral diﬀerences of output;
2. Further, inter–sectoral diﬀerences in terms of openness to international
trade might also aﬀect the results, by having a deﬂating eﬀect on
manufacturing prices, as the manufacturing sector has a higher export
propensity than services.
Overall, the empirical evidence presented in this work can be interpreted
in the light of both the Keynesian and the neo–Schumpeterian streams of
literature, as it implies the co–presence of (and most likely a virtuous circle
between) a sustained growth of patterns of ﬁnal demand, especially private
and public domestic consumption, and strong increases in the share of KIBS
as intermediate inputs, following changes in the production organisation of
most branches of the economy. These latter are in turn most likely to be
due to the indirect impact of the shift in the technological paradigm toward
ICT–related technologies. However, the empirical investigation carried out in
this paper does not allow direct examination of the nature of the changes in
intermediate demand and their relationship with the ICT paradigm. Never-
theless, the empirical ﬁndings summed up above allow to infer some general
characteristics of the determinants of structural change, which we formulate
as working hypotheses for future steps of our research agenda. In particular:
1. The growth and composition of demand ultimately shape the structural
changes of sectoral output growth in advanced economies. At the meso–
macro level of analysis and within an input–output framework, we have
seen that a predominant role in determining the growth of services has
to be attributed to the increase of demand for services as intermediate
inputs for the whole economy (services themselves included).
2. Final demand and technology are self–reinforcing in determining the
growth dynamics of service ﬁrms8, whereas intermediate demand fac-
tors account for the transmission of micro behaviours into macro–level
consequences in terms of structural change. At the micro level of anal-
ysis, we expect favourable demand conditions to represent a necessary
incentive for ﬁrms to respond to technological shocks, innovate and
grow. On the contrary, we argue that the exploitation of technological
8This evidence has been found by Cainelli, Evangelista, and Savona (2006).
16opportunities, especially those provided by the pervasive use of Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies, is not a suﬃcient condition
for (service) ﬁrms and sectors to experience positive growth rates of
output and employment.
To conclude, it seems all the more crucial to devote more eﬀort to in-
tegrating — especially in the domain of services — Keynesian and neo–
Schumpeterian ‘lines of thought’ (Verspagen, 2002a; Verspagen, 2002b). Draw-
ing upon the ‘empirical stylised facts’ presented in this work, we devote future
steps of research to the formalisation of a model of macro–economic growth
with evolutionary micro–founded structural change9
9Lorentz, A. and M. Savona (2005) ‘Demand, Technology and Growth of Services:
A Growth Model with Evolutionary Micro–Founded Structural Change’ (Mimeo, BETA
ULP).
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21Appendix
Table 1: Sectors Included in the analysis
ISIC Rev.3 Acronym Industry
1-14 AGRI Agriculture, hunting, forestry, ﬁshing, mining,
and quarrying
15-16 FOOD Food products, beverage and tabacco
17-19 TEXTILE Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear
20-22 WOOD Wood, wood products, cork, pulp, paper,
paper products, printing and publishing
23-26 CHEM Chemical, rubber, plastic, fuel products,
and other non–metallic mineral products
27-35 MACHINERY Basic and fabricated metal prod.,
machinery and equipments
36-37 MANEC Manufacturing n.e.c.
40-45 ELEC Electricity, Gas, Water and Construction
50-55 TRADE Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels and restaurants
60-64 TRACOM Transports, storage and communications
65-67 FINANCE Financial Intermediation
70-74 KIBS Real estate; Renting of machinery and equipment;
computer and related; R&D; business services**
75-99 SOCIAL Community; social; personal and other government
services
**Business services (74) includes: Legal and Accounting; Engineering; Technical
Consultancy; Marketing; Training; Cleaning; Security
22Table 2: I–O Structural Decomposition of Average Annual Output Growth
(constant prices*) % - Germany (1978-1995)(I)
Sectors Gross Intermediate Consumption Investment Net export
Output demand
1978-1986
AGRI -1.01 -1.90 -0.12 0.10 0.91
FOOD -0.65 -0.27 -0.50 -0.18 0.30
TEXTILE -1.15 0.69 -1.57 -0.22 -0.04
WOOD 0.26 -0.54 0.55 -0.33 0.57
CHEM 1.34 -0.06 0.55 0.18 0.67
MACHINERY 1.84 -0.22 0.46 0.70 0.90
MANEC 0.95 -0.48 0.73 -0.37 1.07
ELEC 1.08 0.26 0.79 -0.10 0.13
TRADE 0.58 -0.18 0.37 -0.07 0.46
TRACOM 2.15 -0.05 1.45 0.06 0.70
FINANCE 5.09 2.36 2.19 0.11 0.43
KIBS 5.77 2.71 2.69 0.12 0.25
SOCIAL 2.51 0.17 2.21 0.04 0.09
1986-1988
AGRI -5.07 -11.47 -0.40 0.09 6.70
FOOD -1.86 -2.33 0.03 -0.14 0.58
TEXTILE -1.04 -1.73 -0.57 3.20 -1.94
WOOD 3.54 0.55 2.64 0.76 -0.41
CHEM 0.82 -1.84 -0.44 1.25 1.85
MACHINERY 1.76 -0.68 0.78 2.03 -0.37
MANEC 4.21 1.08 0.23 3.19 -0.29
ELEC 0.48 -0.53 -0.23 1.08 0.17
TRADE 3.31 0.56 2.59 0.53 -0.37
TRACOM 3.78 1.57 2.13 0.53 -0.44
FINANCE 0.93 -1.93 2.08 0.67 0.11
KIBS 7.51 4.04 2.92 0.62 -0.07
SOCIAL 3.13 0.36 2.53 0.05 0.20
1988-1990
AGRI -1.70 -5.75 4.60 2.36 -2.90
FOOD 2.54 -1.90 4.10 -0.94 1.28
TEXTILE 0.94 -2.30 3.93 2.23 -2.93
WOOD 5.82 0.68 3.51 1.97 -0.34
CHEM 4.12 1.49 3.32 0.58 -1.28
MACHINERY 5.26 -1.08 2.06 4.40 -0.11
MANEC 6.04 0.96 3.57 1.26 0.25
ELEC 5.23 -0.40 1.29 4.39 -0.06
TRADE 5.73 0.19 3.82 1.06 0.66
TRACOM 4.43 -0.88 3.61 0.96 0.74
FINANCE 4.72 -1.23 4.50 1.41 0.04
KIBS 9.25 3.70 4.02 1.38 0.15
SOCIAL 2.22 0.29 1.93 0.12 -0.13
Source: OECD Input Output Tables, own calculation
* The ﬁgures have been deﬂated using the market prices index (base year 1985)
23Table 3: I–O Structural Decomposition of Average Annual Output Growth
(constant prices*) % - Germany(1978-1995)(II)
Sectors Gross Intermediate Consumption Investment Net export
Output demand
1990-1995
AGRI 0.79 -4.20 1.05 2.27 1.67
FOOD -2.10 -1.10 -1.06 0.61 -0.54
TEXTILE -6.13 -2.02 -1.49 -0.66 -1.97
WOOD 0.61 -0.60 1.13 0.26 -0.19
CHEM -1.93 -2.73 -0.84 1.56 0.08
MACHINERY -1.12 0.53 0.00 -0.33 -1.32
MANEC -6.16 -6.10 2.92 0.69 -3.67
ELEC 7.83 0.94 0.82 6.42 -0.34
TRADE 6.24 0.61 4.84 0.54 0.25
TRACOM 8.82 2.63 6.01 1.39 -1.22
FINANCE 9.12 4.54 4.59 1.24 -1.25
KIBS 4.99 1.20 2.12 1.83 -0.16
SOCIAL 27.28 6.78 20.21 0.68 -0.39
1978-1995
AGRI -1.01 -3.32 0.47 0.72 1.12
FOOD -0.83 -0.83 -0.13 -0.03 0.16
TEXTILE -2.19 -0.56 -0.83 0.26 -1.05
WOOD 1.51 -0.28 1.33 0.33 0.13
CHEM 0.59 -0.84 0.24 0.84 0.36
MACHINERY 1.40 -0.13 0.61 1.09 -0.17
MANEC -0.56 -1.86 1.80 0.47 -0.97
ELEC 4.04 0.27 0.87 2.95 -0.05
TRADE 3.72 0.21 2.80 0.34 0.36
TRACOM 5.75 0.81 4.16 0.85 -0.07
FINANCE 7.55 2.12 4.77 1.00 -0.34
KIBS 8.76 3.07 4.05 1.53 0.11
SOCIAL 12.65 2.22 10.12 0.36 -0.06
Source: OECD Input Output Tables, own calculation
* The ﬁgures have been deﬂated using the market prices index (base year 1985)
24Table 4: I–O Structural Decomposition of Average Annual Output Growth
(constant prices*) % - The Netherlands (1972-1998) (I)
Sectors Gross Intermediate Consumption Investment Net export
Output demand
1972-1977
AGRI 7.17 5.27 1.73 0.19 -0.02
FOOD 1.36 0.70 0.65 0.02 -0.01
TEXTILE -5.85 0.75 -1.82 -0.70 -4.09
WOOD 2.29 0.90 3.85 0.30 -2.75
CHEM 6.99 1.24 1.75 0.04 3.96
MACHINERY 1.57 -0.51 2.08 1.39 -1.39
MANEC 3.64 -2.20 10.30 0.64 -5.10
ELEC 2.30 1.09 1.54 -0.62 0.28
TRADE 3.24 -0.06 2.27 0.13 0.91
TRACOM 2.00 -0.49 1.80 0.10 0.59
FINANCE 7.27 2.95 3.47 0.21 0.63
KIBS 8.16 1.44 4.81 1.62 0.29
SOCIAL 5.99 -0.03 5.95 -0.06 0.13
1977-1981
AGRI 6.99 6.92 1.48 -2.03 0.62
FOOD 1.52 0.07 0.03 -0.46 1.88
TEXTILE -5.60 -1.22 -3.99 -0.44 0.04
WOOD 1.02 -0.21 0.45 -0.56 1.35
CHEM 6.98 4.99 1.86 -1.41 1.54
MACHINERY 0.54 0.56 -0.64 -1.72 2.34
MANEC 1.56 -5.39 -3.50 -1.62 12.07
ELEC 2.60 0.70 1.80 -0.18 0.28
TRADE 0.65 0.20 -0.13 -0.29 0.87
TRACOM 3.34 0.49 0.60 -0.11 2.37
FINANCE 5.30 3.05 1.75 -0.51 1.01
KIBS 5.05 1.13 3.80 -0.53 0.65
SOCIAL 2.38 0.19 2.04 0.05 0.10
1981-1986
AGRI -1.10 -6.11 0.32 0.03 4.66
FOOD 0.69 -1.69 0.49 0.20 1.69
TEXTILE 1.04 0.87 0.92 0.97 -1.73
WOOD 1.67 -0.13 0.68 0.38 0.73
CHEM -3.15 -2.47 -0.23 -0.49 0.05
MACHINERY 2.59 0.55 1.07 5.90 -4.93
MANEC -0.10 -2.15 -0.11 1.56 0.60
ELEC -0.98 -0.65 0.61 -0.68 -0.26
TRADE 2.24 0.36 0.28 0.75 0.85
TRACOM 1.01 0.10 0.68 0.24 -0.02
FINANCE 3.49 1.20 1.60 0.55 0.13
KIBS 5.31 1.20 3.54 0.60 -0.02
SOCIAL 0.32 0.07 0.18 0.02 0.05
Source: OECD Input Output Tables, own calculation
* The ﬁgures have been deﬂated using the market prices index (base year 1985)
25Table 5: I–O Structural Decomposition of Average Annual Output Growth
(constant prices) % - The Netherlands (1972-1998) (II)
Sectors Gross Intermediate Consumption Investment Net export
Output demand
1986-1998
AGRI -0.95 -1.86 -0.67 0.87 0.71
FOOD 0.27 -0.38 -1.18 0.03 1.80
TEXTILE -1.32 -0.91 -0.24 1.01 -1.18
WOOD 2.30 0.26 0.39 0.90 0.75
CHEM 1.31 -0.10 -0.19 1.46 0.15
MACHINERY 2.71 1.97 -0.12 1.55 -0.69
MANEC 83.14 17.41 60.43 31.03 -25.73
ELEC 4.39 1.68 -0.16 2.87 0.00
TRADE 7.86 2.32 2.68 0.88 1.98
TRACOM 5.56 0.23 3.59 0.52 1.23
FINANCE 7.19 0.72 5.38 1.24 -0.15
KIBS 18.00 9.66 6.08 3.40 -1.14
SOCIAL 6.23 1.93 4.70 0.46 -0.86
1972-1998
AGRI 1.82 -0.59 0.01 0.47 1.93
FOOD 0.84 -0.36 -0.44 0.02 1.62
TEXTILE -2.07 -0.57 -0.62 0.21 -1.09
WOOD 2.42 0.07 1.36 0.61 0.38
CHEM 2.74 0.35 0.54 0.56 1.29
MACHINERY 2.60 0.98 0.66 2.23 -1.27
MANEC 50.91 6.62 39.09 18.77 -13.58
ELEC 3.15 0.95 0.88 1.25 0.07
TRADE 6.31 1.22 2.45 0.77 1.86
TRACOM 4.74 0.05 3.04 0.37 1.29
FINANCE 10.47 1.96 6.96 1.28 0.28
KIBS 23.09 8.23 11.19 4.14 -0.47
SOCIAL 6.12 1.09 5.17 0.38 -0.53
Source: OECD Input Output Tables, own calculation
* The ﬁgures have been deﬂated using the market prices index (base year 1985)
26Table 6: I–O Structural Decomposition of Average Annual Output Growth
(constant prices*) % - UK (1968-1990) (I)
Sectors Gross Intermediate Consumption Investment Net export
Output demand
1968-1979
AGRI 6.54 3.96 0.52 0.79 1.27
FOOD 4.02 1.11 2.50 0.27 0.15
TEXTILE -1.25 -0.52 0.45 0.41 -1.59
WOOD 2.29 -0.38 2.21 0.87 -0.41
CHEM 4.82 1.29 2.69 1.09 -0.25
MACHINERY 0.85 -0.76 1.20 1.47 -1.06
MANEC 7.29 2.96 4.41 0.84 -0.93
ELEC 3.16 1.12 1.44 0.61 0.00
TRADE 4.18 0.68 2.54 0.71 0.26
TRACOM 3.04 0.10 2.27 0.69 -0.02
FINANCE 2.03 0.27 -0.21 1.34 0.64
KIBS 4.15 2.19 1.42 0.43 0.11
SOCIAL 6.00 1.22 4.51 0.22 0.04
1979-1984
AGRI 3.85 -0.52 -1.20 -0.75 6.31
FOOD -2.65 -0.48 -2.53 -0.36 0.72
TEXTILE -5.75 -0.34 -2.01 -0.24 -3.17
WOOD -1.57 0.31 -1.46 0.93 -1.36
CHEM -1.34 0.90 -0.33 -0.87 -1.04
MACHINERY -3.52 -0.24 -0.24 -1.29 -1.75
MANEC -6.77 -1.49 -1.50 -0.63 -3.15
ELEC 0.72 -0.24 -0.24 1.29 -0.08
TRADE -0.51 -2.02 2.01 -0.50 0.00
TRACOM -2.22 -0.64 0.75 -0.38 -1.95
FINANCE 8.61 5.55 0.63 2.41 0.02
KIBS 12.95 12.87 0.03 -0.25 0.30
SOCIAL 1.53 -2.46 4.13 0.04 -0.17
1984-1990
AGRI -6.19 -4.81 0.69 0.83 -2.91
FOOD -1.19 -0.17 -0.84 0.17 -0.34
TEXTILE -1.07 0.05 1.65 -0.47 -2.31
WOOD 4.01 1.69 5.24 -1.03 -1.90
CHEM -1.36 -2.77 1.06 0.96 -0.61
MACHINERY 2.72 0.19 2.00 1.75 -1.22
MANEC 1.99 -4.23 12.81 0.77 -7.37
ELEC 6.91 2.15 1.48 3.65 -0.37
TRADE 5.53 2.36 3.88 0.70 -1.42
TRACOM 7.86 3.69 4.81 -0.62 -0.02
FINANCE 9.85 10.70 7.90 -8.45 -0.30
KIBS 15.11 11.54 4.64 1.29 -2.37
SOCIAL 9.00 1.77 7.65 -0.02 -0.39
Source: OECD Input Output Tables, own calculation
* The ﬁgures have been deﬂated using the market prices index (base year 1985)
27Table 7: I–O Structural Decomposition of Average Annual Output Growth
(constant prices*) % - UK (1968-1990) (II)
Sectors Gross Intermediate Consumption Investment Net export
Output demand
1990-1998
AGRI -1.48 -2.92 1.24 0.42 -0.22
FOOD 3.98 -1.32 5.59 0.01 -0.31
TEXTILE 0.93 -3.08 3.90 0.43 -0.33
WOOD -1.02 -2.96 0.36 -0.11 1.69
CHEM 2.89 -0.57 2.98 0.28 0.20
MACHINERY 0.68 0.08 0.14 1.12 -0.67
MANEC 35.33 8.22 14.63 13.64 -1.16
ELEC -0.94 0.15 -0.62 -0.56 0.09
TRADE 5.11 -0.40 3.88 0.26 1.37
TRACOM 5.23 1.32 3.00 0.23 0.68
FINANCE 3.30 -0.47 2.44 0.19 1.13
KIBS 19.54 5.60 11.19 0.65 2.09
SOCIAL 4.40 1.62 2.42 0.17 0.20
1968-1998
AGRI 0.46 -1.36 0.14 0.37 1.31
FOOD 1.77 -0.10 1.80 0.02 0.05
TEXTILE -1.27 -0.80 0.61 0.09 -1.18
WOOD 1.05 -0.75 1.76 0.16 -0.12
CHEM 2.05 -0.37 2.35 0.39 -0.32
MACHINERY 0.35 -0.41 0.95 0.90 -1.10
MANEC 13.68 1.98 10.25 5.33 -3.88
ELEC 2.75 0.79 0.74 1.30 -0.07
TRADE 5.57 0.18 4.54 0.43 0.41
TRACOM 4.92 0.74 4.20 0.06 -0.07
FINANCE 8.40 3.37 5.56 -1.53 0.99
KIBS 35.74 11.35 20.91 2.34 1.14
SOCIAL 9.07 0.74 8.22 0.15 -0.04
Source: OECD Input Output Tables, own calculation
* The ﬁgures have been deﬂated using the market prices index (base year 1985)
28Table 8: I–O Structural Decomposition of Average Annual Output Growth
(constant prices*) % - USA (1972-1990)(I)
Sectors Gross Intermediate Consumption Investment Net export
Output demand
1972-1977
AGRI 9.63 4.66 4.36 0.59 0.02
FOOD 2.57 0.09 1.97 0.15 0.35
TEXTILE 0.88 -1.15 1.38 0.97 -0.33
WOOD 4.40 0.54 2.95 0.84 0.07
CHEM 11.58 5.08 5.39 1.57 -0.46
MACHINERY 4.94 0.51 1.53 2.43 0.46
MANEC 3.41 -0.28 4.11 0.76 -1.18
ELEC 4.24 1.62 1.70 0.95 -0.02
TRADE 5.14 0.88 2.86 0.92 0.47
TRACOM 5.01 0.75 3.01 0.59 0.66
FINANCE 3.54 0.02 3.17 0.27 0.08
KIBS 2.32 -1.23 2.78 0.55 0.22
SOCIAL 5.01 0.72 3.92 -0.25 0.62
1977-1982
AGRI 4.08 2.04 2.30 -0.39 0.13
FOOD 0.00 -0.44 0.62 -0.18 0.00
TEXTILE -3.65 -1.66 0.34 -1.46 -0.87
WOOD 0.08 -1.12 1.30 -0.40 0.29
CHEM 2.33 0.11 2.78 -0.83 0.27
MACHINERY -1.74 -1.41 0.46 -0.54 -0.25
MANEC -0.45 -0.82 1.08 0.68 -1.39
ELEC 4.44 1.17 1.44 1.88 -0.06
TRADE 0.92 0.13 0.87 -0.20 0.12
TRACOM 2.15 0.38 1.56 -0.21 0.42
FINANCE 5.49 1.40 3.43 -0.03 0.69
KIBS 4.53 1.84 2.69 -0.06 0.06
SOCIAL 4.19 0.17 3.32 0.41 0.30
1982-1985
AGRI -5.01 -6.81 1.89 0.69 -0.78
FOOD -1.01 -1.72 0.92 0.28 -0.49
TEXTILE -0.22 1.17 2.60 0.91 -4.89
WOOD 3.99 0.43 4.12 0.99 -1.55
CHEM -1.57 -2.27 1.05 1.12 -1.48
MACHINERY 4.32 -0.62 6.00 2.77 -3.83
MANEC -4.97 -0.87 2.95 -2.55 -4.51
ELEC 0.68 -2.07 1.99 0.92 -0.16
TRADE 4.04 -0.91 4.54 0.77 -0.37
TRACOM 2.94 -1.33 4.73 0.43 -0.90
FINANCE 5.18 -0.41 5.45 0.29 -0.15
KIBS 7.94 1.98 5.90 0.46 -0.41
SOCIAL 6.54 1.75 3.98 0.58 0.23
Source: OECD Input Output Tables, own calculation
* The ﬁgures have been deﬂated using the market prices index (base year 1985)
29Table 9: I–O Structural Decomposition of Average Annual Output Growth
(constant prices*) % - USA (1972-1990)(II)
Sectors Gross Intermediate Consumption Investment Net export
Output demand
1985-1990
AGRI -0.82 -3.01 0.79 1.15 0.25
FOOD 1.48 -0.72 1.81 0.02 0.36
TEXTILE -0.86 -0.86 1.51 0.65 -2.15
WOOD 5.26 0.77 2.68 0.51 1.30
CHEM 1.61 -0.72 1.58 0.45 0.29
MACHINERY 0.79 -0.02 -0.70 0.44 1.06
MANEC 5.83 0.56 6.44 1.49 -2.66
ELEC 0.48 -0.84 1.16 0.08 0.08
TRADE 5.86 0.73 4.63 0.15 0.35
TRACOM 2.81 -0.03 1.35 0.32 1.17
FINANCE 7.93 -0.34 7.77 0.08 0.42
KIBS 5.80 1.83 3.39 0.36 0.21
SOCIAL 2.88 -1.14 5.77 -0.26 -1.49
1990-1997
AGRI 1.35 -0.70 0.45 1.79 -0.20
FOOD 1.33 -0.09 1.01 0.37 0.05
TEXTILE 0.43 -0.98 3.88 0.78 -3.25
WOOD -0.37 -0.40 -0.04 0.76 -0.69
CHEM 1.37 -0.68 1.03 1.38 -0.37
MACHINERY 3.62 0.20 -0.04 4.46 -0.99
MANEC 23.36 5.38 12.41 11.80 -6.23
ELEC 2.11 -0.60 -0.69 3.39 0.00
TRADE 4.46 0.71 2.37 1.21 0.17
TRACOM 6.34 1.16 4.04 1.12 0.02
FINANCE 10.33 2.24 6.94 0.71 0.44
KIBS 7.34 0.60 4.06 2.39 0.29
SOCIAL 2.51 -0.90 2.49 0.26 0.66
1972-1997
AGRI 2.26 -0.38 1.70 1.04 -0.10
FOOD 1.13 -0.39 1.29 0.14 0.09
TEXTILE -0.65 -0.72 1.63 0.25 -1.82
WOOD 2.74 -0.09 2.23 0.71 -0.11
CHEM 3.94 0.25 3.00 1.07 -0.38
MACHINERY 2.70 -0.21 1.00 2.48 -0.58
MANEC 9.23 1.01 7.43 4.65 -3.87
ELEC 3.10 -0.03 0.89 2.25 -0.01
TRADE 6.00 0.51 4.24 1.00 0.25
TRACOM 5.91 0.39 4.26 0.79 0.47
FINANCE 12.63 0.99 10.35 0.68 0.61
KIBS 9.17 0.95 6.16 1.81 0.26
SOCIAL 5.73 -0.17 5.64 0.17 0.09
Source: OECD Input Output Tables, own calculation
* The ﬁgures have been deﬂated using the market prices index (base year 1985)
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